added missing files: romix.[hc]pp
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include/fc/crypto/romix.hpp
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include/fc/crypto/romix.hpp
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// Most of this file has been ported from EncryptionUtils.cpp from BitcoinArmory:
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// //
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// Copyright(C) 2011-2013, Armory Technologies, Inc. //
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// Distributed under the GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL v3) //
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// See LICENSE or http://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl.html //
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// //
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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//
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// For the KDF:
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//
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// This technique is described in Colin Percival's paper on memory-hard
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// key-derivation functions, used to create "scrypt":
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//
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// http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf
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//
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// The goal is to create a key-derivation function that can force a memory
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// requirement on the thread applying the KDF. By picking a sequence-length
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// of 1,000,000, each thread will require 32 MB of memory to compute the keys,
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// which completely disarms GPUs of their massive parallelization capabilities
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// (for maximum parallelization, the kernel must use less than 1-2 MB/thread)
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//
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// Even with less than 1,000,000 hashes, as long as it requires more than 64
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// kB of memory, a GPU will have to store the computed lookup tables in global
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// memory, which is extremely slow for random lookup. As a result, GPUs are
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// no better (and possibly much worse) than a CPU for brute-forcing the passwd
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//
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// This KDF is actually the ROMIX algorithm described on page 6 of Colin's
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// paper. This was chosen because it is the simplest technique that provably
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// achieves the goal of being secure, and memory-hard.
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//
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// The computeKdfParams method well test the speed of the system it is running
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// on, and try to pick the largest memory-size the system can compute in less
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// than 0.25s (or specified target).
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//
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//
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// NOTE: If you are getting an error about invalid argument types, from python,
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// it is usually because you passed in a BinaryData/Python-string instead
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// of a SecureBinaryData object
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//
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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#pragma once
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#include <string>
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namespace fc {
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// A memory-bound key-derivation function -- uses a variation of Colin
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// Percival's ROMix algorithm: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf
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//
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// The computeKdfParams method takes in a target time, T, for computation
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// on the computer executing the test. The final KDF should take somewhere
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// between T/2 and T seconds.
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class romix
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{
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public:
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romix(u_int32_t memReqts, u_int32_t numIter, std::string salt);
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std::string deriveKey_OneIter(std::string const & password);
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std::string deriveKey(std::string const & password);
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private:
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u_int32_t hashOutputBytes_;
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u_int32_t kdfOutputBytes_; // size of final key data
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u_int32_t memoryReqtBytes_;
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u_int32_t sequenceCount_;
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std::string salt_; // prob not necessary amidst numIter, memReqts
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// but I guess it can't hurt
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u_int32_t numIterations_; // We set the ROMIX params for a given memory
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// req't. Then run it numIter times to meet
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// the computation-time req't
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};
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}
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99
src/crypto/romix.cpp
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99
src/crypto/romix.cpp
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// Most of this file has been ported from EncryptionUtils.cpp from BitcoinArmory:
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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// //
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// Copyright(C) 2011-2013, Armory Technologies, Inc. //
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// Distributed under the GNU Affero General Public License (AGPL v3) //
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// See LICENSE or http://www.gnu.org/licenses/agpl.html //
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// //
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////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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#include <fc/crypto/sha256.hpp>
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#include <fc/crypto/sha512.hpp>
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#include <fc/crypto/romix.hpp>
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#include <string.h>
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namespace fc
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{
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romix::romix( u_int32_t memReqts, u_int32_t numIter, std::string salt ) :
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hashOutputBytes_( 64 ),
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kdfOutputBytes_( 32 )
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{
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memoryReqtBytes_ = memReqts;
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sequenceCount_ = memoryReqtBytes_ / hashOutputBytes_;
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numIterations_ = numIter;
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salt_ = salt;
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}
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std::string romix::deriveKey_OneIter( std::string const & password )
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{
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static fc::sha512 sha512;
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// Concatenate the salt/IV to the password
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std::string saltedPassword = password + salt_;
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// Prepare the lookup table
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char *lookupTable_ = new char[memoryReqtBytes_];
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u_int32_t const HSZ = hashOutputBytes_;
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// First hash to seed the lookup table, input is variable length anyway
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fc::sha512 hash = sha512.hash(saltedPassword);
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memcpy(lookupTable_, &hash, HSZ);
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// Compute <sequenceCount_> consecutive hashes of the passphrase
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// Every iteration is stored in the next 64-bytes in the Lookup table
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for( u_int32_t nByte = 0; nByte < memoryReqtBytes_ - HSZ; nByte += HSZ )
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{
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// Compute hash of slot i, put result in slot i+1
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fc::sha512 hash = sha512.hash(lookupTable_ + nByte, HSZ);
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memcpy(lookupTable_ + nByte + HSZ, &hash, HSZ);
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}
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// LookupTable should be complete, now start lookup sequence.
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// Start with the last hash from the previous step
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std::string X(lookupTable_ + memoryReqtBytes_ - HSZ, HSZ);
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std::string Y(HSZ, '0');
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// We "integerize" a hash value by taking the last 4 bytes of
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// as a u_int32_t, and take modulo sequenceCount
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u_int64_t* X64ptr = (u_int64_t*)(X.data());
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u_int64_t* Y64ptr = (u_int64_t*)(Y.data());
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u_int64_t* V64ptr = NULL;
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u_int32_t newIndex;
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u_int32_t const nXorOps = HSZ / sizeof(u_int64_t);
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// Pure ROMix would use sequenceCount_ for the number of lookups.
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// We divide by 2 to reduce computation time RELATIVE to the memory usage
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// This still provides suffient LUT operations, but allows us to use more
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// memory in the same amount of time (and this is the justification for
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// the scrypt algorithm -- it is basically ROMix, modified for more
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// flexibility in controlling compute-time vs memory-usage).
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u_int32_t const nLookups = sequenceCount_ / 2;
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for(u_int32_t nSeq=0; nSeq<nLookups; nSeq++)
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{
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// Interpret last 4 bytes of last result (mod seqCt) as next LUT index
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newIndex = *(u_int32_t*)(X.data()+HSZ-4) % sequenceCount_;
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// V represents the hash result at <newIndex>
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V64ptr = (u_int64_t*)(lookupTable_ + HSZ * newIndex);
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// xor X with V, and store the result in X
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for(u_int32_t i = 0; i < nXorOps; i++)
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*(Y64ptr + i) = *(X64ptr + i) ^ *(V64ptr + i);
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// Hash the xor'd data to get the next index for lookup
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fc::sha512 hash = sha512.hash(Y.data(), HSZ);
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X.assign(hash.data(), HSZ);
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}
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// Truncate the final result to get the final key
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delete lookupTable_;
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return X.substr(0, kdfOutputBytes_);
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}
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std::string romix::deriveKey( std::string const & password )
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{
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std::string masterKey(password);
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for(u_int32_t i=0; i<numIterations_; i++)
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masterKey = deriveKey_OneIter(masterKey);
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return masterKey;
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}
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} // namespace fc
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