peerplays_migrated/libraries/chain/include/graphene/chain/protocol/confidential.hpp

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2015 Cryptonomex, Inc., and contributors.
*
* The MIT License
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
* in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
* to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
* THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#pragma once
#include <graphene/chain/protocol/base.hpp>
namespace graphene { namespace chain {
using fc::ecc::blind_factor_type;
/**
* @defgroup stealth Stealth Transfer
* @brief Operations related to stealth transfer of value
*
* Stealth Transfers enable users to maintain their finanical privacy against even
* though all transactions are public. Every account has three balances:
*
* 1. Public Balance - everyone can see the balance changes and the parties involved
* 2. Blinded Balance - everyone can see who is transacting but not the amounts involved
* 3. Stealth Balance - both the amounts and parties involved are obscured
*
* Account owners may set a flag that allows their account to receive(or not) transfers of these kinds
* Asset issuers can enable or disable the use of each of these types of accounts.
*
* Using the "temp account" which has no permissions required, users can transfer a
* stealth balance to the temp account and then use the temp account to register a new
* account. In this way users can use stealth funds to create anonymous accounts with which
* they can perform other actions that are not compatible with blinded balances (such as market orders)
*
* @section referral_program Referral Progam
*
* Stealth transfers that do not specify any account id cannot pay referral fees so 100% of the
* transaction fee is paid to the network.
*
* @section transaction_fees Fees
*
* Stealth transfers can have an arbitrarylly large size and therefore the transaction fee for
* stealth transfers is based purley on the data size of the transaction.
*/
///@{
/**
* @ingroup stealth
* This data is encrypted and stored in the
* encrypted memo portion of the blind output.
*/
struct blind_memo
{
account_id_type from;
share_type amount;
string message;
/** set to the first 4 bytes of the shared secret
* used to encrypt the memo. Used to verify that
* decryption was successful.
*/
uint32_t check= 0;
};
/**
* @ingroup stealth
*/
struct blind_input
{
fc::ecc::commitment_type commitment;
/** provided to maintain the invariant that all authority
* required by an operation is explicit in the operation. Must
* match blinded_balance_id->owner
*/
authority owner;
};
/**
* When sending a stealth tranfer we assume users are unable to scan
* the full blockchain; therefore, payments require confirmation data
* to be passed out of band. We assume this out-of-band channel is
* not secure and therefore the contents of the confirmation must be
* encrypted.
*/
struct stealth_confirmation
{
struct memo_data
{
optional<public_key_type> from;
asset amount;
fc::sha256 blinding_factor;
fc::ecc::commitment_type commitment;
uint32_t check = 0;
};
/**
* Packs *this then encodes as base58 encoded string.
*/
operator string()const;
/**
* Unpacks from a base58 string
*/
stealth_confirmation( const std::string& base58 );
stealth_confirmation(){}
public_key_type one_time_key;
optional<public_key_type> to;
vector<char> encrypted_memo;
};
/**
* @class blind_output
* @brief Defines data required to create a new blind commitment
* @ingroup stealth
*
* The blinded output that must be proven to be greater than 0
*/
struct blind_output
{
fc::ecc::commitment_type commitment;
/** only required if there is more than one blind output */
range_proof_type range_proof;
authority owner;
optional<stealth_confirmation> stealth_memo;
};
/**
* @class transfer_to_blind_operation
* @ingroup stealth
* @brief Converts public account balance to a blinded or stealth balance
*/
struct transfer_to_blind_operation : public base_operation
{
struct fee_parameters_type {
uint64_t fee = 5*GRAPHENE_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION; ///< the cost to register the cheapest non-free account
uint32_t price_per_output = 5*GRAPHENE_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION;
};
asset fee;
asset amount;
account_id_type from;
blind_factor_type blinding_factor;
vector<blind_output> outputs;
account_id_type fee_payer()const { return from; }
void validate()const;
share_type calculate_fee(const fee_parameters_type& )const;
};
/**
* @ingroup stealth
* @brief Converts blinded/stealth balance to a public account balance
*/
struct transfer_from_blind_operation : public base_operation
{
struct fee_parameters_type {
uint64_t fee = 5*GRAPHENE_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION; ///< the cost to register the cheapest non-free account
};
asset fee;
asset amount;
account_id_type to;
blind_factor_type blinding_factor;
vector<blind_input> inputs;
account_id_type fee_payer()const { return GRAPHENE_TEMP_ACCOUNT; }
void validate()const;
void get_required_authorities( vector<authority>& a )const
{
for( const auto& in : inputs )
a.push_back( in.owner );
}
};
/**
* @ingroup stealth
* @brief Transfers from blind to blind
*
* There are two ways to transfer value while maintaining privacy:
* 1. account to account with amount kept secret
* 2. stealth transfers with amount sender/receiver kept secret
*
* When doing account to account transfers, everyone with access to the
* memo key can see the amounts, but they will not have access to the funds.
*
* When using stealth transfers the same key is used for control and reading
* the memo.
*
* This operation is more expensive than a normal transfer and has
* a fee proportional to the size of the operation.
*
* All assets in a blind transfer must be of the same type: fee.asset_id
* The fee_payer is the temp account and can be funded from the blinded values.
*
* Using this operation you can transfer from an account and/or blinded balances
* to an account and/or blinded balances.
*
* Stealth Transfers:
*
* Assuming Receiver has key pair R,r and has shared public key R with Sender
* Assuming Sender has key pair S,s
* Generate one time key pair O,o as s.child(nonce) where nonce can be inferred from transaction
* Calculate secret V = o*R
* blinding_factor = sha256(V)
* memo is encrypted via aes of V
* owner = R.child(sha256(blinding_factor))
*
* Sender gives Receiver output ID to complete the payment.
*
* This process can also be used to send money to a cold wallet without having to
* pre-register any accounts.
*
* Outputs are assigned the same IDs as the inputs until no more input IDs are available,
* in which case a the return value will be the *first* ID allocated for an output. Additional
* output IDs are allocated sequentially thereafter. If there are fewer outputs than inputs
* then the input IDs are freed and never used again.
*/
struct blind_transfer_operation : public base_operation
{
struct fee_parameters_type {
uint64_t fee = 5*GRAPHENE_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION; ///< the cost to register the cheapest non-free account
uint32_t price_per_output = 5*GRAPHENE_BLOCKCHAIN_PRECISION;
};
asset fee;
vector<blind_input> inputs;
vector<blind_output> outputs;
/** graphene TEMP account */
account_id_type fee_payer()const;
void validate()const;
share_type calculate_fee( const fee_parameters_type& k )const;
void get_required_authorities( vector<authority>& a )const
{
for( const auto& in : inputs )
a.push_back( in.owner );
}
};
///@} endgroup stealth
} } // graphene::chain
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::stealth_confirmation,
(one_time_key)(to)(encrypted_memo) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::stealth_confirmation::memo_data,
(from)(amount)(blinding_factor)(commitment)(check) );
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::blind_memo,
(from)(amount)(message)(check) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::blind_input,
(commitment)(owner) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::blind_output,
(commitment)(range_proof)(owner)(stealth_memo) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::transfer_to_blind_operation,
(fee)(amount)(from)(blinding_factor)(outputs) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::transfer_from_blind_operation,
(fee)(amount)(to)(blinding_factor)(inputs) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::blind_transfer_operation,
(fee)(inputs)(outputs) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::transfer_to_blind_operation::fee_parameters_type, (fee)(price_per_output) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::transfer_from_blind_operation::fee_parameters_type, (fee) )
FC_REFLECT( graphene::chain::blind_transfer_operation::fee_parameters_type, (fee)(price_per_output) )
Merge beatrice(GPOS changes) with master (#270) * Created unit test for #325 * remove needless find() * issue - 154: Don't allow to vote when vesting balance is 0 * Increase block creation timeout to 2500ms * increase delay for node connection * remove cache from cli get_account * add cli tests framework * Adjust newly merged code to new API * Merged changes from Bitshares PR 1036 * GRPH-76 - Short-cut long sequences of missed blocks Fixes database::update_global_dynamic_data to speed up counting missed blocks. (This also fixes a minor issue with counting - the previous algorithm would skip missed blocks for the witness who signed the first block after the gap.) * Improved resilience of block database against corruption * Moved reindex logic into database / chain_database, make use of additional blocks in block_database Fixed tests wrt db.open * Enable undo + fork database for final blocks in a replay Dont remove blocks from block db when popping blocks, handle edge case in replay wrt fork_db, adapted unit tests * Log starting block number of replay * Prevent unsigned integer underflow * Fixed lock detection * Dont leave _data_dir empty if db is locked * Writing the object_database is now almost atomic * Improved consistency check for block_log * Cut back block_log index file if inconsistent * Fixed undo_database * Added test case for broken merge on empty undo_db * exclude second undo_db.enable() call in some cases * Add missing change * change bitshares to core in message * Merge pull request #938 from bitshares/fix-block-storing Store correct block ID when switching forks * Fixed integer overflow issue * Fix for for history ID mismatch ( Bitshares PR #875 ) * Update the FC submodule with the changes for GRPH-4 * Merged Bitshares PR #1462 and compilation fixes * Support/gitlab (#123) * Updated gitlab process * Fix undefined references in cli test * Updated GitLab CI * Fix #436 object_database created outside of witness data directory * supplement more comments on database::_opened variable * prevent segfault when destructing application obj * Fixed test failures and compilation issue * minor performance improvement * Added comment * Fix compilation in debug mode * Fixed duplicate ops returned from get_account_history * Fixed account_history_pagination test * Removed unrelated comment * Update to fixed version of fc * Skip auth check when pushing self-generated blocks * Extract public keys before pushing a transaction * Dereference chain_database shared_ptr * Updated transaction::signees to mutable and * updated get_signature_keys() to return a const reference, * get_signature_keys() will update signees on first call, * modified test cases and wallet.cpp accordingly, * no longer construct a new signed_transaction object before pushing * Added get_asset_count API * No longer extract public keys before pushing a trx and removed unused new added constructor and _get_signature_keys() function from signed_transaction struct * changes to withdraw_vesting feature(for both cdd and GPOS) * Comments update * update to GPOS hardfork ref * Remove leftover comment from merge * fix for get_vesting_balance API call * braces update * Allow sufficient space for new undo_session * Throw for deep nesting * node.cpp: Check the attacker/buggy client before updating items ids The peer is an attacker or buggy, which means the item_hashes_received is not correct. Move the check before updating items ids to save some time in this case. * Create .gitlab-ci.yml * Added cli_test to CI * fixing build errors (#150) * fixing build errors vest type correction * fixing build errors vest type correction * fixes new Dockerfile * vesting_balance_type correction vesting_balance_type changed to normal * gcc5 support to Dockerfile gcc5 support to Dockerfile * use random port numbers in app_test (#154) * Changes to compiple with GCC 7(Ubuntu 18.04) * proposal fail_reason bug fixed (#157) * Added Sonarcloud code_quality to CI (#159) * Added sonarcloud analysis (#158) * changes to have separate methods and single withdrawl fee for multiple vest objects * 163-fix, Return only non-zero vesting balances * Support/gitlab develop (#168) * Added code_quality to CI * Update .gitlab-ci.yml * Point to PBSA/peerplays-fc commit f13d063 (#167) * [GRPH-3] Additional cli tests (#155) * Additional cli tests * Compatible with latest fc changes * Fixed Spacing issues * [GRPH-106] Added voting tests (#136) * Added more voting tests * Added additional option * Adjust p2p log level (#180) * merge gpos to develop (#186) * issue - 154: Don't allow to vote when vesting balance is 0 * changes to withdraw_vesting feature(for both cdd and GPOS) * Comments update * update to GPOS hardfork ref * fix for get_vesting_balance API call * braces update * Create .gitlab-ci.yml * fixing build errors (#150) * fixing build errors vest type correction * fixing build errors vest type correction * fixes new Dockerfile * vesting_balance_type correction vesting_balance_type changed to normal * gcc5 support to Dockerfile gcc5 support to Dockerfile * Changes to compiple with GCC 7(Ubuntu 18.04) * changes to have separate methods and single withdrawl fee for multiple vest objects * 163-fix, Return only non-zero vesting balances * Revert "Revert "GPOS protocol"" This reverts commit 67616417b7f0b5d087b9862de0e48b2d8ccc1bca. * add new line needed to gpos hardfork file * comment temporally cli_vote_for_2_witnesses until refactor or delete * fix gpos tests * fix gitlab-ci conflict * Fixed few error messages * error message corrections at other places * Updated FC repository to peerplays-network/peerplays-fc (#189) Point to fc commit hash 6096e94 [latest-fc branch] * Project name update in Doxyfile (#146) * changes to allow user to vote in each sub-period * Fixed GPOS vesting factor issue when proxy is set * Added unit test for proxy voting * Review changes * changes to update last voting time * resolve merge conflict * unit test changes and also separated GPOS test suite * delete unused variables * removed witness check * eliminate time gap between two consecutive vesting periods * deleted GPOS specific test suite and updated gpos tests * updated GPOS hf * Fixed dividend distribution issue and added test case * fix flag * clean newlines gpos_tests * adapt gpos_tests to changed flag * Fix to roll in GPOS rules, carry votes from 6th sub-period * check was already modified * comments updated * updated comments to the benefit of reviewer * Added token symbol name in error messages * Added token symbol name in error messages (#204) * case 1: Fixed last voting time issue * get_account bug fixed * Fixed flag issue * Fixed spelling issue * remove non needed gcc5 changes to dockerfile * GRPH134- High CPU Issue, websocket changes (#213) * update submodule branch to refer to the latest commit on latest-fc branch (#214) * Improve account maintenance performance (#130) * Improve account maintenance performance * merge fixes * Fixed merge issue * Fixed indentations and extra ';' * Update CI for syncing gitmodules (#216) * Added logging for the old update_expired_feeds bug The old bug is https://github.com/cryptonomex/graphene/issues/615 . Due to the bug, `update_median_feeds()` and `check_call_orders()` will be called when a feed is not actually expired, normally this should not affect consensus since calling them should not change any data in the state. However, the logging indicates that `check_call_orders()` did change some data under certain circumstances, specifically, when multiple limit order matching issue (#453) occurred at same block. * https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core/issues/453 * Minor performance improvement for price::is_null() * Use static refs in db_getter for immutable objects * Minor performance improvement for db_maint * Minor code updates for asset_evaluator.cpp * changed an `assert()` to `FC_ASSERT()` * replaced one `db.get(asset_id_type())` with `db.get_core_asset()` * capture only required variables for lambda * Improve update_expired_feeds performance #1093 * Change static refs to member pointers of db class * Added getter for witness schedule object * Added getter for core dynamic data object * Use getters * Removed unused variable * Add comments for update_expired_feeds in db_block * Minor refactory asset_create_evaluator::do_apply() * Added FC_ASSERT for dynamic data id of core asset * Added header inclusions in db_management.cpp * fix global objects usage during replay * Logging config parsing issue * added new files * compilation fix * Simplified code in database::pay_workers() * issue with withdrawl * Added unit test for empty account history * set extensions default values * Update GPOS hardfork date and don't allow GPOS features before hardfork time * refer to latest commit of latest-fc branch (#224) * account name or id support in all database api * asset id or name support in all asset APIs * Fixed compilation issues * Fixed alignment issues * Externalized some API templates * Externalize serialization of blocks, tx, ops * Externalized db objects * Externalized genesis serialization * Externalized serialization in protocol library * Undo superfluous change * remove default value for extension parameter * fix compilation issues * GRPH-46-Quit_command_cliwallet * removed multiple function definition * Fixed chainparameter update proposal issue * Move GPOS withdraw logic to have single transaction(also single fee) and update API * Added log for authorization failure of proposal operations * Votes consideration on GPOS activation * bump fc version * fix gpos tests * Bump fc version * Updated gpos/voting_tests * Fixed withdraw vesting bug * Added unit test * Update hardfork date for TESTNET, sync fc module and update logs * avoid wlog as it filling up space * Beatrice hot fix(sync issue fix) * gpos tests fix * Set hardfork date to Jan5th on TESTNET Co-authored-by: Peter Conrad <github.com@quisquis.de> Co-authored-by: John M. Jones <jmjatlanta@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: obucinac <obucinac@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Bobinson K B <bobinson@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Alfredo Garcia <oxarbitrage@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Miha Čančula <miha@noughmad.eu> Co-authored-by: Abit <abitmore@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Roshan Syed <r.syed@pbsa.info> Co-authored-by: Sandip Patel <sandip@knackroot.com> Co-authored-by: RichardWeiYang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: gladcow <jahr@yandex.ru> Co-authored-by: satyakoneru <satyakoneru.iiith@gmail.com>
2020-02-07 15:53:08 +00:00
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::transfer_to_blind_operation::fee_parameters_type )
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::transfer_from_blind_operation::fee_parameters_type )
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::blind_transfer_operation::fee_parameters_type )
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::transfer_to_blind_operation )
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::transfer_from_blind_operation )
GRAPHENE_EXTERNAL_SERIALIZATION( extern, graphene::chain::blind_transfer_operation )